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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the court by §78-2-
2(3) (j), U.C.A. This appeal is from a final order of the 
District Court of the Third Judicial District of Tooele 
County, State of Utah. The order to be reviewed is the Order 
entered October 13, 1989 (R.655) and the lower court's 
rulings from the bench leading up to that Order (R.660 and 
661, p. 36-44). The Notice of Appeal was filed November 13, 
1989. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY EXTENDED THE TIME FOR REDEMPTION 
FROM THE SHERIFF'S SALE TO OCTOBER 10, 1989. 
POINT II 
HAVING PROPERLY EXTENDED THE REDEMPTION PERIOD, THE LOWER 
COURT WAS IN ERROR IN TERMINATING THAT EXTENSION BY ITS 
ARBITRARY BENCH RULINGS OF SEPTEMBER 8 AND OCTOBER 2, 1989 
AND ITS ORDER OF OCTOBER 13, 1989. 
POINT III 
LEWISES WERE ENTITLED TO A HEARING UNDER RULE 69(f)(3) TO 
DETERMINE THE REASONABLENESS OR PROPRIETY OF THE REDEMPTION 
AMOUNT AND WERE ENTITLED TO OFFSET OR RECOUP AGAINST THE 
REDEMPTION PRICE THE COST TO REPAIR THE DAMAGE TO THE 
PROPERTY DONE BY STATE LINE. 
POINT IV 
THE REMEDY PROVIDED IN RULE 69(g)(1) DOES NOT APPLY IN THIS 
CASE NOR DOES IT PRECLUDE AN OFFSET UNDER A RULE 69(f)(3) 
DETERMINATION. 
STATUTES AND RULES TO BE INTERPRETED 
Utah Code Annotated 
§78-37-6 Right of redemption—Sales by parcels—Of land and 
water stock 
Sales of real estate under judgments of foreclosure of 
mortgages and liens are subject to redemption as in case of 
sales under executions generally. In all cases where the 
judgment directs the sale of land, together with shares of 
corporate stock evidencing title to a water right used or 
intended to be used, or suitable for use, on the land, the 
court shall equitably apportion such water stock to the land, 
or some part thereof, in one or more parcels, as it may deem 
suitable for the sale thereof, and the land and water stock 
in each parcel shall be sold together, and for the purpose of 
such sale shall be regarded as real estate and subject to 
redemption as above specified. In all sales of real estate 
under foreclosure the court may determine the parcels and the 
order in which such parcels of property shall be sold. 
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Code of Judicial Administration 
Rule 4-501. Notions. 
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda. 
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, 
except uncontested or ex parte matters, shall be accompanied 
by a memorandum of points and authorities, appropriate 
affidavits, and copies of or citations by page number to 
relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other documents 
relied upon in support of the motion. Memoranda supporting 
or opposing a motion shall not exceed ten pages in length 
exclusive of the "statement of material facts" as provided in 
paragraph (2), except as waived by order of the court on ex-
parte application. If an ex-parte application is made to 
file an over-length memorandum, the application shall state 
the length of the principal memorandum, and if the memorandum 
is in excess of ten pages, the application shall include a 
summary of the memorandum, not to exceed five pages. 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The 
responding party shall file and serve upon all parties within 
ten days after service of a motion, a memorandum in 
opposition to the motion, all supporting documentation and a 
copy of the proposed order. If the responding party fails to 
file a memorandum in opposition to the motion within ten days 
after service of the motion, the moving party may notify the 
clerk to submit the matter to the court for decision as 
provided in paragraph 1(d) of this rule. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 6. Time. 
(b) Enlargement. When by these rules or by a notice 
given thereunder or by order of the court an act is required 
or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the 
court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) 
with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if 
request therefor is made before the expiration of the period 
originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order or 
(2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified 
period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was 
the result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the 
time for taking any action under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), 
(d) and (e), 60(b) and 73(a) and (g), except to the extent 
and under the conditions stated in them. 
-v-
(d) For motions—Affidavits. A written motion, other 
than one which may be heard ex parte, and notice of the 
hearing thereof shall be served not later than 5 days before 
the time specified for the hearing, unless a different period 
is fixed by these rules or by order of the court. Such an 
order may for cause shown be made on ex parte application. 
When a motion is supported by affidavit, the affidavit shall 
be served with the motion; and, except as otherwise provided 
in Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may be served not later 
than 1 day before the hearing, unless the court permits them 
to be served at some other time. 
Rule 65A. Injunctions. 
. . . . 
(b) Temporary restraining order; notice; rehearing; 
duration. No temporary restraining order shall be granted 
without notice to the adverse party unless it clearly appears 
from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified 
complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or 
damage will result to the applicant before notice can be 
served and a hearing had thereon. Every temporary 
restraining order granted without notice shall be endorsed 
with the date and hour of issuance; and shall be filed 
forthwith in the clerkfs office and entered of record; shall 
define the injury and state why it is irreparable and why the 
order was granted without notice; and shall expire by its 
terms within such time after entry, not to exceed 10 days, as 
the court fixes, unless within the time so fixed the order, 
for good cause shown, is extended for a like period or unless 
the party against whom the order is directed consents that it 
may be extended for a longer period. The reasons for the 
extension shall be entered of record. In case a temporary 
restraining order is granted without notice, the motion for a 
preliminary injunction shall be set down for hearing at the 
earliest possible time and takes precedence of all matters 
except older matters of the same character; and when the 
motion comes on for hearing the party who obtained the 
temporary restraining order shall proceed with the 
application for a preliminary injunction and, if he does not 
do so, the court shall dissolve the temporary restraining 
order. On 2 days1 notice to the party who obtained the 
temporary restraining order without notice or on such shorter 
notice to that party as the court may prescribe, the adverse 
party may appear and move its dissolution or modification and 
in that event the court shall proceed to hear and determine 
such motion as expeditiously as the ends of justice require. 
vi-
Rule 69. Execution and proceedings supplemental thereto. 
• • • • 
(e) Proceedings on sale of property. 
• • • • 
(4) Purchaser refusing to pay. Every bid shall be 
deemed an irrevocable offer; and if the purchaser refuses to 
pay the amount bid by him for the property struck off to him 
at a sale under execution, the officer may again sell the 
property at any time to the highest bidder, and if any loss 
is occasioned thereby, the party refusing to pay, in addition 
to being liable on such bid, is guilty of a contempt of court 
and may be punished accordingly. When a purchaser refuses to 
pay, the officer may also, in his discretion, thereafter 
reject any other bid of such person. 
(f) Redemption from sale. 
• • • • 
(3) Time for redemption; amount to be paid. The 
property may be redeemed from the purchaser within six months 
after the sale on paying the amount of his purchase with 6 
percent thereon in addition, together with the amount of any 
assessment or taxes, and any reasonable sum for fire 
insurance and necessary maintenance, upkeep, or repair of any 
improvements upon the property which the purchaser may have 
paid thereon after the purchase, with interest on such 
amounts, and, if the purchaser is also a creditor having a 
lien prior to that of the person seeking redemption, other 
than the judgment under which said purchase was made, the 
amount of such lien, with interest. 
In the event there is a disagreement as to whether 
any sum demanded for redemption is reasonable or proper, the 
person seeking redemption may pay the amount necessary for 
redemption, less the amount in dispute, to the court out of 
which execution or order authorizing the sale was issued, and 
at the same time file with the court a petition setting forth 
the item or items demanded to which he objects, together with 
his grounds of objection; and thereupon the court shall enter 
an order fixing a time for hearing of such objections. A 
copy of the petition and order fixing time for hearing shall 
be served on the purchaser not less than two days before the 
day of hearing. Upon the hearing of the objections the court 
shall enter an order determining the amount required for 
redemption. In the event an additional amount to that 
therefore paid to the clerk is required, the person seeking 
•vii 
redemption shall pay to the clerk such additional amount 
within 7 days. The purchaser shall forthwith execute and 
deliver a proper certificate of redemption upon being paid 
the amount required by the court for redemption. 
• • • • 
(6) Rents during period of redemption. The 
purchaser from the time of sale until a redemption, and a 
redemptioner from the time of his redemption until another 
redemption, is entitled to receive from the tenant in 
possession the rents of the property sold or the value of the 
use and occupation thereof. But when any rents or profits 
have been received by the judgment creditor or purchaser, or 
his or their assigns, from the property thus sold preceding 
such redemption, the amounts of such rents and profits shall 
be a credit upon the redemption money to be paid; and if the 
redemptioner or judgment debtor, before the expiration of the 
time allowed for such redemption, demands in writing of such 
purchaser or creditor, or his assigns, a written and verified 
statement of the amounts of such rents and profits thus 
received, the period for redemption is extended five days 
after such sworn statement is given by such purchaser or his 
assigns to such redemptioner or debtor. If such purchaser or 
his assigns shall for a period of one month from and after 
such demand, fail or refuse to give such statement, such 
redemptioner or debtor may, within sixty days after such 
demand, bring an action to compel an accounting and 
disclosure of such rents and profits, and until fifteen days 
from and after the final determination of such action the 
right of redemption is extended to such redemptioner or 
debtor. 
(g) Remedies of purchaser. 
(1) For waste. Until the expiration of the time 
allowed for redemption, the court may restrain the commission 
of waste on the property, upon motion, with or without 
notice, of the purchaser, or his successor in interest. But 
it is not waste for the person in possession of the property 
at the time of sale, or entitled to possession afterwards, 
during the period allowed for redemption, to continue to use 
it in the same manner in which it was previously used, or to 
use it in the ordinary course of husbandry, or to make the 
necessary repairs or (sic) buildings thereon or to use wood 
or timber on the property therefor, or for the repair of 
fences, or for fuel for his family while he occupies the 
property. After his estate has become absolute, the 
purchaser or his successor in interest may maintain an action 
to recover damages for injury to the property by the tenant 
in possession after sale and before possession is delivered 
under the conveyance. 
-viii-
(2) Where purchaser fails to obtain possession of 
property or is dispossessed thereof or evicted therefrom. 
Where, because of irregularities in the proceedings 
concerning the sale, or because the property sold was not 
subject to execution and sale, or because of the reversal or 
discharge of the judgment, a purchaser of property sold on 
execution, or his successor in interest, fails to obtain the 
property or is dispossessed thereof or evicted therefrom, the 
court having jurisdiction thereof shall, on motion of such 
party and after such notice to the judgment creditor as the 
court may prescribe, enter judgment against such judgment 
creditor for the price paid by the purchaser, together with 
interest. In the alternative, if such purchaser or his 
successor in interest, fails to recover possession of any 
property or is dispossessed thereof or evicted therefrom in 
consequence of irregularity in the proceedings concerning the 
sale, or because the property sold was not subject to 
execution and sale, the court having jurisdiction thereof 
shall, on motion of such party and after such notice to the 
judgment debtor as the court may prescribe, revive the 
original judgment in the name of the petitioner for the 
amount paid by such purchaser at the sale, with interest 
thereon from the time of payment at the same rate that the 
original judgment bore; and the judgment so revived shall 
have the same force and effect as would an original judgment 
of the date of the revival. 
-ix-
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
PATRICIA HUSTON, Trustee of 
Trust A and Trust B under the 
Will of John Huston, deceased, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
A. R. SPAULDING and JOYCE 
SPAULDING, and RUSSELL R. 
LEWIS and MITZI LEWIS, 
Defendants-Appellants, 
vs. 
STATE LINE PROPERTIES INC., 
Purchaser at Sheriff*s 
Sale and Respondent. 
Case No. 89-0476 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This appeal arises from the attempt by the defendants, 
Russell R. Lewis and Mitzi Lewis (hereinafter "Lewises") to 
redeem real property from a sheriff's sale after the 
purchaser at the sheriff's sale, State Line Properties Inc. 
(hereinafter "State Line"), had demolished improvements on 
the property. Lewises obtained a bid to restore the 
improvements, deposited $50,000.00 in court to redeem the 
1 
property, and obtained from the court an extension of the 
time to redeem and an order setting a hearing to determine 
the amount required to redeem. State Line then filed motions 
to dissolve the extension and to strike the hearing to 
determine the amount required to redeem. 
Disposition in the Lower Court 
Without holding a hearing to determine the redemption 
amount, the lower court on October 2, 1989, ordered Lewises 
to deposit the full amount demanded by State Line to redeem 
($256,000.00) by 5:00 P.M. the next day, October 3, 1989, or, 
should they fail to do so, their right to redeem would be 
terminated. Although Lewises had previously obtained the 
funds to pay the full amount demanded by State Line, they 
were unable to obtain a release of all the conditions on the 
availability of those funds within the one-day deadline 
imposed by the court. The court then entered an order 
terminating their redemption rights. This appeal followed. 
Statement of Facts 
On June 21, 1967, John and Patricia Huston sold the 
property involved in this action (a motel property in 
Wendover, Utah, hereinafter referred to as the "motel" or 
"property") to A. R. and Joyce Spaulding pursuant to a real 
estate contract providing for deferred payments over fifteen 
years (R.16). On May 15, 1970, the Spauldings resold the 
2 
motel to the Lewises pursuant to another deferred-payment 
contract. On December 16, 1977, the Lewises resold the motel 
(excluding some of the adjacent ground) to Marcia S. Merrill 
pursuant to a third deferred-payment contract (R.520). In 
1984 Merrill failed to make the payments due the Lewises 
which resulted in defaults in the payments due Spauldings and 
Hustons. Patricia Huston, as trustee under trusts under the 
will of John Huston, to which the Hustons' interest in the 
property had passed, commenced an action to foreclose the 
Huston-Spaulding contract as a note and mortgage, joining the 
Spauldings, Lewises and Merrill as defendants since they held 
interests in the motel (R.23). 
On January 27, 1989, a Decree of Foreclosure was entered 
providing for the sale of the motel by the Sheriff (R.496). 
On February 28, 1989, the Sheriff of Tooele County sold the 
motel to State Line for $210,000.00 (R.574, Para. 1). Up 
until the time of the sheriff's sale, the motel had been used 
and operated as a motel, generating income to the owner 
(R.528, Para. 3). The Lewises intended to redeem the motel 
from the sheriff's sale in order to continue the operation of 
the motel business. They had previously operated the motel 
(R.528, Para. 6) and were then also operating another motel 
on nearby property. 
State Line took possession of the motel property and 
commenced to demolish many of the buildings and to dismantle 
electrical equipment on the property (R.528, para. 4). 
3 
Lewises, by letter from their attorney on March 17, 1989, 
notified State Line of their right to redeem the property and 
that the demolition of the buildings on the property was in 
violation of their rights as potential redeeming parties. 
Recognizing that its actions were wrongful, State Line 
immediately ceased any further demolition of the motel 
property (R.592, Para. 2). 
On August 24, 1989, Lewises, by hand-delivered letter 
from their attorney to State Line and by mail to the Sheriff, 
informed State Line and the Sheriff of their intent to redeem 
the property and requested an itemized statement of the 
amounts required to redeem less the amounts required to 
repair the damage caused by State Line, Request was also 
made for a verified written statement of rents and profits 
since the sheriff's sale (R. 592, Para. 3). When no response 
to their requests had been received by August 28, 1989, the 
day the redemption period would otherwise have expired, 
Lewises decided to take three alternative actions: (1) They 
filed with the court a Rule 6(b) Motion to Extend Time for 
Redemption from sheriff's sale (R.505), supported by an 
affidavit (R.516) and a memorandum of law (R.511); (2) They 
filed a Rule 69(f)(3) Petition for Determination of 
Reasonableness or Propriety of Redemption Amount (R.524), 
supported by an affidavit (R.529) and a bid showing the cost 
to repair the demolition damages of $388,000.00 (R.539); (3) 
They deposited $50,000.00 cash in court (R.540-5) to redeem 
4 
the property from sherifffs sale, not knowing the amount 
required to redeem but figuring that, since their bid to 
repair the damage exceeded the $210,000.00 paid at the 
sheriff's sale thus leaving nothing due to redeem, $50,000.00 
would demonstrate their good faith and ability to redeem and 
provide a substantial "cushion" in the event the court did 
not accept the costs to repair in full. The court granted 
the motion to extend the time to redeem and extended the 
redemption period until October 10, 1989 (R.504) and also 
issued an Order Fixing Time for Hearing of Petition for 
Determination of Reasonableness or Propriety of Redemption 
Amount, setting a hearing for September 27, 1989 (R.548). 
Copies of these orders and the supporting documents were 
hand-delivered that day to State Line's registered agent 
(R.503, 508, 514, 522, 527, 544, 547). 
After filing these documents and obtaining these orders 
in Tooele County, the attorney for Lewises returned to his 
office at 6:00 P.M. on August 28, 1989 and found a statement 
from State Line's attorneys asserting that $256,599.45 was 
required to redeem the property (R.592, Para. 4, R.579) 
including $14,134.20 for the costs of demolishing the 
property, which were claimed to be for repairs, maintenance, 
and securing the property. 
At 5:30 P.M. on September 6, 1989, State Line delivered 
to Lewises' attorney a Motion to Dissolve the Court's Order 
Extending Redemption Period, along with a supporting 
5 
affidavit and memorandum, and a Notice setting a hearing on 
that motion fir September 8, 1989 at 9:30 A.M. (R.592, Para. 
6) • These documents were not filed with the court until 
after the hearing on September 8, 1989 (R.552, 575, 584, 
588). on September 7, 1989, Lewises hand-delivered to State 
Line's attorney an Objection to Hearing (R.590) and 
supporting affidavit (R.543) objecting to such a hearing on 
less than two days1 notice and without an opportunity to 
respond to the affidavit and memorandum. 
Despite Lewises' objections to the hearing on such short 
notice, the court held the hearing on September 8, 1989 and 
ordered from the bench that Lewises pay $260,000.00 into an 
interest-bearing account within five days and "then the 
redemption period will continue until the 27th [September 27, 
1989], or until the date that the matter is heard by the 
court to make the determination as far as any waste on the 
property" (R.660, p. 3, 1. 9-16). On September 18, 1989, 
State Line submitted to Lewises1 attorney a proposed order on 
State Line Properties Inc.'s Motion to Dissolve the Court's 
Order Extending Redemption Period, which included language 
that went beyond the court's bench ruling (R.615). Lewises 
filed objections to the proposed order on September 19, 1989 
(R.596). On September 26, 1989, State Line filed Motion to 
Strike Hearing of September 27, 1989 (R.628) and set that 
motion and Lewises' objections to the proposed order for 
hearing on October 2, 1989 (R.636). The court had informed 
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counsel by telephone that the hearing on September 27, 1989 
could not be held because a criminal matter would take 
priority on that day. 
The Lewises were not able to pay the $260,000.00 into an 
interest-bearing account within the five days ordered by the 
court but on September 29, 1989, they arranged for a loan of 
$210,000,00 from a lender who insisted on placing the funds 
in escrow with Merrill Title Company (R.642, Para. 6 & 7) . 
The vice president of Merrill Title Company submitted an 
affidavit confirming that he had $210,000.00 in escrow for 
the purpose of redeeming the property subject to obtaining a 
first lien on the property and on obtaining certificates of 
title to certain listed vehicles and an airplane (R.646). 
On October 2, 1989, the court ruled from the bench that 
Lewises must deposit $256,000.00 in escrow subject only to 
delivery of good title to the motel property to Lewises by 
5:00 P.M. the next day, October 3, 1989, or their right to 
redeem would be terminated (R.661, p.38). Within that short 
time period, Lewises were unable to remove the condition on 
release of the escrowed funds with respect to delivery of 
certificates of title to the vehicles and the airplane 
because the lender of those funds insisted on a report from 
the Federal Aviation Administration Airman and Aircraft 
Registry in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, on the title to the 
airplane. Such a report requires several days to obtain. 
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Therefore, the court signed the Order of October 13, 1989, 
terminating the Lewises1 right of redemption (R.655). This 
appeal followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Extension of the redemption period was appropriate. The 
redemption period following a sheriff's sale is set by Rule 
69(f)(3), U.R.C.P., and that period may be extended under 
Rule 6(b) with or without motion or notice for cause shown 
upon request before the expiration of the redemption period. 
The adverse effect on Lewises1 ability to redeem caused by 
State Line's wrongful demolition of the improvements on the 
property is sufficient cause to justify such an extension. 
The deposit of $50,000.00 cash with the court and the 
Lewises' attempt In have the court immediately determine the 
redemption price demonstrated their good faith and ability to 
redeem. The lower court properly exercised its equitable 
powers in extending the redemption period for forty-three 
days to October 10, 1989. 
II. The subsequent termination of the redemption rights was 
in error. The lower court was in error when it terminated 
the Lewises1 right of redemption based on State Line's 
untimely motion to dissolve the extension filed under Rule 
65A, which governs restraining orders and injunctions, and on 
State Line's motion to strike the hearing to determine the 
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redemption price. Forcing Lewises to deposit the full 
$256,000.00 demanded by State Line within five days, in the 
first instance, and within one day, in the second instance, 
without holding a hearing to determine what the redemption 
price should be, was completely contrary to the principles of 
equity which govern the foreclosure and redemption process. 
Although the Lewises could not comply exactly with the 
court's arbitrary rulings, they did demonstrate the ability 
to pay the full amount demanded by State Line, despite State 
Line's destruction of the security for the redemption money. 
The court erred in terminating their right of redemption 
before the conditions on the use of the redemption money 
could be removed, before a hearing to determine the 
redemption price, and before the expiration of the redemption 
period as extended by the court. 
III. Rule 69ffW3) provides the means to equitably resolve 
the dispute. The essential issue in this case is how to deal 
with State Line's wrongful demolition of the improvements on 
the foreclosed property and its effect on Lewises' right of 
redemption. State Line should not benefit from its own 
wrong. Rule 69(f)(3) provides the means of quickly resolving 
disputes over the redemption price and the equitable 
principles of set-off and recoupment allow Lewises to recoup 
the costs of repair and restoration against the redemption 
price since the claim for recoupment arises out of the same 
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transaction or proceeding that gives rise to the right of 
State Line f n receive the redemption money. The same 
proceeding which determines "the amount of taxes, insurance 
premiums, repairs, maintenance and security paid during the 
redemption period, as additions to the redemption price, is 
appropriate to determine the amount of rents and profits 
received from, and damage done to, the property during the 
redemption period, as deductions from the redemption price. 
Both elements of such determination are unliquidated until 
determined by the court. The lower court should have 
proceeded with its scheduled hearing to determine all 
elements of the redemption price. 
IV. Rule 69(g)(1) is not applicable to these parties nor to 
these facts. Rule 69(f)(3) is intended to protect redeeming 
parties from improper demands made by the purchaser at the 
sheriff's sale. On the other hand, Rule 69(g)(1) is intended 
to protect the purchaser against improper use or treatment of 
the foreclosed property by a tenant in possession. Rule 
69(f)(3) is, therefore, the appropriate procedure to consider 
the entire question of the redemption amount and to prevent 
the purchaser from "clogging" the right of redemption. By 
purchasing at the sheriff's sale, State Line became a party 
to this case and submitted itself to the rules which govern 
it. It is not entitled to force the Lewises to pay its 
arbitrary, unliquidated demands and then pursue their claims 
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for destruction of the property in a separate, lengthy, 
expensive proceeding which may result only in an 
uncollectible judgment against a shell corporation. Equity 
requires that total relief between these parties be 
determined in one proceeding and Rule 69(f)(3) has 
established a simple procedure to make that determination 
without undue prejudice to either party. 
V. A full Role 69(fW31 hearing should be held on remand. 
The lower court's order terminating Lewises1 right of 
redemption should be reversed and this case remanded for a 
determination of appropriate additions to and deductions from 
the redemption price. Only then can equity between the 
parties be done. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY EXTENDED THE TIME FOR 
REDEMPTION FROM THE SHERIFFS SALE TO OCTOBER 10, 
1989. 
The statutory right of redemption from foreclosure sales 
is established by §78-37-6, U.C.A., which provides: 
"Sales of real estate under judgments of 
foreclosure of mortgages and liens are subject to 
redemption as in case of sales under executions 
generally . . . " 
Execution sales are governed by Rule 69, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and Rule 69(f)(3) provides the time for redemption 
as follows: 
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"The property may be redeemed from the purchaser 
within six months after the sale on paying the 
amount of his purchase with 6% thereon in addition, 
together with the amount of any assessment or 
taxes, and any reasonable sum for fire insurance 
and necessary maintenance, upkeep, or repair of any 
improvements on the property which the purchaser 
may have paid thereon after the purchase, with 
interest on such amounts, and, if the purchaser is 
also a creditor having a lien prior to that of the 
person seeking redemption, other than the judgment 
under which said purchase was made, the amount of 
such lien, with interest•" 
Extensions of the time periods set forth in the various Rules 
of Civil Procedure are governed by Rule 6(b), which provides: 
"When by these rules or by a notice given 
thereunder or by order of the court an act is 
required or allowed to be done at or within a 
specified time, the court for cause shown may at 
any time in its discretion (1) with or without 
motion or notice order the period enlarged if 
request therefor is made before the expiration of 
the period originally prescribed or as extended by 
a previous order, or (2) upon motion made after the 
expiration of the specified period permit the act 
to be done where the failure to act was the result 
of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the 
time for taking any action under Rule 50(b), 52(b), 
59(b), (d) , and (e) , 60(b) and 73(a) and (g) , 
except to the extent and under the conditions 
stated in them." 
Therefore, the court has authority to extend the time 
for redemption under Rule 69(f)(3) "with or without motion or 
notice" for cause shown if request therefor is made before 
the expiration of the redemption period ajid even thereafter 
for excusable neglect upon motion and notice. Since that 
period expired at the end of the day six months from February 
28, 1989, or August 28, 1989, a request made before the end 
of the day on August 28, 1989, could be granted ex parte. 
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In this case the redemption right of Lewises had been 
prejudiced by the actions of State Line, the purchaser at the 
sheriff!s sale, in demolishing and dismantling improvements 
on the property. Lewises have a right to redeem the property 
and take it in the condition it was in at the time of the 
sheriff's sale. The property was an operating motel at the 
time of the sheriff's sale and the demolition terminated that 
use. Lewises have been prevented from taking over an 
operating motel business and have also been hindered in their 
efforts to obtain funds to redeem the property. Lenders who 
would readily advance funds to an operating business would 
not do so on a property in a state of destruction. The cost 
to repair the damage done by State Line, according to the bid 
obtained by the Lewises, added $388,000.00 to the $256,000.00 
cost of redeeming the property. That would, and did, 
discourage lenders who were otherwise prepared to advance the 
redemption money. The demolition by State Line constitutes 
sufficient cause under Rule 6(b)(1) and was such a detriment 
to the position of Lewises that the equitable powers of the 
court were properly exercised to protect their right of 
redemption. 
This court, in Molleruo v. Storage Systems Int'l. 569 
P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977), has recognized the lower court's 
authority, under Rule 6(b), to extend the redemption period 
for cause. While it was determined that cause did not exist 
in that case, this court stated, at 1124: 
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"A court, sitting in equity, may in appropriate 
instances extend the period. This court has 
recognized that equitable principle by setting 
aside a sale after the time for redemption had 
expired, when the sale was attended by such 
substantial irregularities as must have prevented a 
sale at a fair sum, resulting in a gross sacrifice 
of the judgment creditor's property. A similar 
case can be made to relieve a mortgagor of the 
consequences of fraud, accident, mistake, or 
waiver, as is found to exist in United States v. 
Loosley. 551 P.2d 506 (Utah 1976). 
The equitable principles set forth in that case certainly 
apply here to preserve Lewises' right of redemption in the 
face of the inequitable conduct of State Line in demolishing 
the improvements on the property. 
State Line has argued in the lower court and on this 
appeal that Lewises simply appeared ex parte asserting a 
self-serving dispute over the demolition as a means to buy 
time to raise the redemption money and that they should be 
turned away as was the trustee for the debtor in Mollerup. 
But in Mollerup. the party attempting to redeem had not been 
hindered in the redemption process by the wrongful conduct of 
the purchaser at the sheriff's sale. Instead, he came in 
after the redemption period expired and admitted he had made 
no tender of money, had no ability to redeem, and sought the 
extension solely for the purpose of buying time to sell the 
right of redemption in an improving real estate market. In 
this case, the Lewises actually deposited $50,000.00 in 
court, which was substantially more than they thought would 
be required to redeem, sought to have an immediate hearing to 
determine the amount required to redeem, and demonstrated an 
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ability to obtain the entire $256,000.00 demanded by State 
Line in spite of the wrongful conduct of State Line which 
made it extremely difficult for Lewises to raise the 
redemption money. The Lewises were prepared and able to 
redeem and would have done so even if their claimed offset 
were denied in full. They would have paid the full amount 
demanded within thirty days if given a reasonable opportunity 
to do so. 
This case is clearly distinguishable from the holding of 
Mollerup but just as clearly comes within the principles 
enunciated in Mollerup. That case would extend the 
redemption period in "appropriate instances11 including 
"irregularities . . . resulting in a gross sacrifice of the 
. . . property" and "fraud, accident, mistake, or waiver, as 
is found to exist in United States v. Looslev." State Line 
would limit the "appropriate instances" to fraud, mistake, 
accident, or waiver. It is possible that the acts involved 
here could constitute fraud, mistake, accident, or waiver. A 
hearing would be required to determine that. But, it is 
interesting to note that those four terms were included in 
the Mollerup opinion by reference to United States v. 
Loosley, 551 P.2d 506 (Utah 1976), wherein the attempted 
redemption was upheld not because of fraud, mistake, 
accident, or waiver but only because the refusal to accept 
the tendered redemption money was based on the 
"technicalities" of having failed to include the certified 
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copy of the mortgage or lien and the affidavit showing the 
amount due on the lien and delivery of the redemption money 
to the wrong person. Obviously, "appropriate instances" 
include the kind of wrongful activity of State Line in this 
case, who, for all we know at this point, may have 
intentionally destroyed the improvements on the property in 
an attempt to make it impossible for Lewises to redeem. 
The grounds to justify an extension of the redemption 
period exist in this case and the lower court, exercising its 
equitable powers, acted properly in granting an extension for 
only forty-three days. In fact, because of the inequitable 
conduct of State Line, the court, in order to do equity, had 
no other choice. 
POINT II 
HAVING PROPERLY EXTENDED THE REDEMPTION PERIOD, THE 
LOWER COURT WAS IN ERROR IN TERMINATING THAT 
EXTENSION BY ITS ARBITRARY BENCH RULINGS OF 
SEPTEMBER 8 AND OCTOBER 2, 1989 AND ITS ORDER OF 
OCTOBER 13f 1989. 
The Order Extending Redemption Period was hand-delivered 
to State Linefs attorneys on August 28, 1989. Ten days 
later, on September 6, 1989, at 5:30 P.M., they served 
Lewises1 attorney with a Motion to Dissolve the Court's Order 
Extending Redemption Period and with a notice setting the 
hearing of that motion for 9:30 A.M. on September 8, thus 
effectively giving only one-day's notice. They also served 
an affidavit and a 16-page memorandum, indicating that they 
16 
had spent some time, possibly several days, planning their 
"last-minute" motion. Their memorandum argued that the 
extension operated as a restraining order and that they were 
entitled to proceed under Rule 65A to dissolve the extension 
on two-days' notice. Their argument ignored the fact that 
they had not given even two-days1 notice. Lewises filed 
objections to their hearing based on the lack of adequate 
notice under Rule 65A(b), which requires two-days' notice, 
and Rule 6(d), which requires five-days' notice, and Rule 
4-501, Code of Judicial Administration, which requires ten 
days to respond. 
Despite those objections and without examining any of 
the affidavits or memoranda, since they were not filed until 
after the hearing, the court heard the motion and arbitrarily 
ordered from the bench that Lewises pay $260,000.00 into an 
interest-bearing account within five days and "then the 
redemption period will continue until the 27th, or until the 
date that the matter is heard by the court . . . ." Thus, 
the court reduced the previously granted extension to five 
days, making it virtually impossible to raise the redemption 
money. This was based on State Line's motion to dissolve a 
temporary restraining order under Rule 65A. State Line did 
not even comply with Rule 65A because that rule requires at 
least two-days' notice unless the court prescribes a shorter 
notice. See Rule 65A(b). But, State Line's reliance on that 
rule was entirely misplaced. Lewises did not obtain a 
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temporary restraining order and did not attempt to comply 
with the requirements of that rule and State Line was not 
restrained from doing anything. Rather, the Lewises 
proceeded under Rule 6(b) to extend the redemption period. 
That Rule 6(b) authorizes such an extension is clear not only 
on the face of the rule but also from this court's opinion in 
Mollerup, which approved the reliance on Rule 6(b) even if it 
found that the requirements of Rule 6(b) had not been met. 
State Line's motion under Rule 65A was entirely out of order. 
Furthermore, the court's consideration of that motion, or any 
motion, without compliance with Rule 6(d), which requires at 
least five-days' notice for a hearing on a motion, or with 
Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial Administration, which 
would allow Lewises ten days to respond to State Line's 
affidavit and memorandum, was an error which this court 
should correct. 
Ten days later, on September 18, 1989, State Line's 
attorney submitted a proposed Order on State Line Properties 
Inc.'s Motion to Dissolve the Court's Order Extending 
Redemption Period to which Lewises filed objections. Then on 
September 26, 1989, State Line filed a Motion to Strike 
Hearing of September 27, 1989 and set that motion and the 
Lewises' objections for hearing on October 2, 1989. In the 
meantime, the Lewises had arranged for a $210,000.00 loan 
from a lender who insisted on escr owing the funds with 
Merrill Title Company until he could be given a first lien on 
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the motel and on five automobiles and an airplane owned by 
Lewises. Affidavits confirming this loan were filed with the 
court. On October 2, 1989, the lower court again ignored its 
prior orders extending the redemption period and setting a 
hearing to determine the redemption amount and arbitrarily 
ordered Lewises to remove all conditions on the use of the 
escrowed funds, except the granting of a first lien on the 
motel, by 5:00 P.M. the next day. That ruling stated that 
the Lewises' redemption rights would be terminated if they 
failed to remove those conditions. This placed another 
impossible requirement on the Lewises since they could not 
persuade the lender to remove these conditions without a 
report on the title to the airplane which required several 
days to obtain from Oklahoma City. Thus, the court 
terminated Lewises' redemption rights without a hearing to 
determine the redemption amount and without allowing them 
until October 10, 1989 to redeem as provided in its order of 
August 28, 1989. 
The impropriety of the lower court's action was, of 
course, its response to the pressure applied by State Line in 
claiming that its own rights were being violated since it was 
delayed in getting a sheriff's deed to the property. The 
easy answer to State Line's claim is that, if it had not 
filed its motions and had allowed the court to proceed with 
its hearing on the petition to determine the redemption 
amount, the whole matter would have been resolved on or prior 
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to October 10, 1989. Any delay beyond those 43 days is its 
own fault and now that delay is continued by the necessity of 
this appeal. It has itself to blame for any prejudice to its 
position beyond that minimal delay. 
A more thorough response to State Line's claim that its 
rights are abridged requires a consideration of the purposes 
of the rules governing the redemption procedure. Those 
purposes are set forth in United States v. Looslev, 551 P.2d 
506 (Utah 1976), at 508: 
"[T]here are certain principles relating to 
mortgages and their foreclosure to be considered. 
The main purpose of a mortgage is to insure the 
payment of the debt for which is (sic) stands as 
security; and foreclosure is allowed when necessary 
to carry out that objective. But foreclosure is in 
the nature of a forfeiture, which the law does not 
favor. The proceeding is one in equity in which 
principles of equity should be applied consistent 
with the above stated purpose; and neither the 
mortgage nor the foreclosure should be used as an 
instrument of oppression. Accordingly, the law 
provides for the six-month redemption period to 
give the debtor an opportunity to pay his debt and 
salvage his property. 
"Consistent with the foregoing, rules and 
statutes dealing with redemption are regarded as 
remedial in character and should be given liberal 
construction and application to permit a property 
owner who can pay his debts to do so, and thus make 
his creditor whole, and save his property. 
Therefore, if a debtor, acting in good faith, has 
substantially complied with the procedural 
requirements of the rule in such a manner that the 
lender mortgagee is not injured or adversely 
affected, and is getting what he is entitled to, 
the law will not aid in depriving the mortgagor of 
his property for mere falling short of exact 
compliance with technicalities." 
United States v. Looslev involved a purchaser at a 
sheriff's sale who refused to accept a tender of redemption 
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by the assignee of the debtors. Our case is similar in that 
State Line, as the purchaser at the sheriff's sale, also does 
not want to accept a redemption and is doing everything in 
its power to prevent a redemption—from demolishing improve-
ments to filing spurious motions. As in Looslev, the rules 
should be construed and applied liberally to permit the 
debtor to "save his property." Lewises have acted in good 
faith both in attempting to obtain a determination of the 
redemption amount and in attempting to pay that amount. They 
first deposited $50,000.00 in court even though they didn't 
believe they owed anything because of the demolition on the 
property. They then sought to have the court determine the 
amount required to redeem within thirty days.1 When they 
were placed "under the gun" (R.661, p.42-3) by the court's 
orders to deposit the full amount demanded by State Line, in 
five days in the first instance and overnight in the second 
instance, they did their best to comply even though those 
orders were unfair, at least in view of the difficulty of 
raising money on the property as demolished by State Line. 
Those orders merely assisted State Line in its efforts to 
prevent a redemption. When the Lewises have acted in good 
faith, especially under difficult circumstances not of their 
own making, "the law [should] not aid in depriving [them] of 
xUnder Rule 69(f)(3), this hearing could
 # have been set 
on two-days' notice but Lewises wanted to give State Line 
plenty of time to prepare for the hearing (R.662, p.13-14). 
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[their] property for mere falling short of exact compliance 
with technicalities" (Looslev at 508). In this case, the 
lower court's orders have aided in depriving the Lewises of 
their property. The principles set forth in Looslev would 
require that the court abide by its original extension to 
October 10, 1989 and that it hold a hearing to determine the 
amount required to redeem. That would have given them a 
reasonable opportunity to save their property and would not 
have prejudiced State Line in any way since their receipt of 
the redemption price or the sheriff's deed would not have 
been delayed more than 43 days. 
The equitable principles which govern the redemption 
process require that the lower court's order terminating 
Lewises' right of redemption without a hearing to determine 
the redemption amount and without allowing them the time to 
redeem as originally extended be reversed. 
POINT III 
LEWISES WERE ENTITLED TO A HEARING UNDER RULE 
69(f)(3) TO DETERMINE THE REASONABLENESS OR 
PROPRIETY OF THE REDEMPTION AMOUNT AND WERE 
ENTITLED TO OFFSET OR RECOUP AGAINST THE REDEMPTION 
PRICE THE COST TO REPAIR THE DAMAGE TO THE PROPERTY 
DONE BY STATE LINE. 
Although the motions filed by State Line and the rulings 
thereon by the lower court were improper and resulted in an 
inequitable termination of the Lewises' right of redemption, 
they are not the crux of this proceeding. They were 
diversionary tactics by State Line to divert the court's 
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attention away from the crucial issue of how to deal with the 
wrongful conduct of State Line in demolishing the 
improvements on the property. That conduct made redemption 
by Lewises extremely difficult, if not virtually impossible, 
because it deprived them of the use of an operating motel as 
collateral for the redemption money. How then should the 
court deal with this wrongful conduct in an equitable 
proceeding the purpose of which is "to give the debtor an 
opportunity to pay his debt and salvage his property"? 
Loosleyf at 508. The general answer to that question, as 
stated in Loosley, is to construe and apply the "rules and 
statutes dealing with redemption" liberally "to permit a 
property owner who can pay his debts to do so, and thus make 
his creditor whole and save his property." The specific 
answer to that question is to allow the Lewises to offset 
against the redemption price the cost of restoring or 
repairing the damage done to the property by State Line. Any 
other answer would place the burden of State Line's wrongful 
conduct on the Lewises and allow State Line to benefit from 
its own wrong, which is contrary to the principles of equity. 
"No one should benefit from his own wrong." Prudential 
Federal Savings and Loan Ass, v. William L. Pereira and Ass., 
16 U.2d 365, 401 P.2d 439 (1965), at 441; Park v. Jameson, 12 
U.2d 141, 364 P.2d 1 (1961), at 4; McCormick v. Life Ins. 
Corp. of America, 6 U.2d 170, 308 P.2d 949 (1957). 
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Rule 69(f)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides a 
means of quickly resolving disputes over the redemption price 
which is demanded by the purchaser at the sheriff's sale. It 
provides, in the second paragraph: 
"In the event there is a disagreement as to whether 
any sum demanded for redemption is reasonable or 
proper, the person seeking redemption may pay the 
amount necessary for redemption, less the amount in 
dispute, to the court . . . and at the same time 
file with the court a petition setting forth the 
item or items demanded to which he objects, 
together with his grounds for objection; . . . Upon 
the hearing of the objections the court shall enter 
an order determining the amount required for 
redemption. In the event an additional amount to 
that theretofore paid to the clerk is required, the 
person seeking redemption shall pay to the clerk 
such additional amount within 7 days." (emphasis 
supplied) 
It is true that the prior paragraph of Rule 69(f)(3) 
lists only items which may be added to the redemption price 
and not items to be deducted therefrom.2 But this does not 
mean that the person seeking redemption may only object to 
such additional items. The rule allows for an objection to 
any sum demanded by the purchaser, including "the amount of 
his purchase." It seems only "reasonable [and] proper" that 
the amount of his purchase be reduced by any offset to which 
the party seeking redemption is equitably entitled because of 
the wrongful conduct of the purchaser. 
2Rule 69(f)(6) does allow for credits against the 
redemption price for rents and profits and provides a 
procedure to obtain an accounting if the purchaser fails to 
deliver a statement of such rents and profits. 
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The equitable principles of set-off and recoupment are 
discussed and applied in Freston v. Gulf Oil Co.. 565 P.2d 
787 (Utah 1977), in which it was held that the defendant 
could withhold from the plaintiffs royalty payments under an 
oil and gas lease in order to recoup prior overpayments under 
the lease. In responding to the plaintiffs1 claim that the 
overpayments had been spent and should not be returned, the 
court stated, at 788: 
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 • . • defendant has not asked for repayment, it 
has merely looked to the future proceeds of the 
lease to recoup the overpayment and plaintiffs are 
not required to dig into their pocket and return 
the overpayment in toto. 
"In the absence of a showing of prejudice, equity 
requires a right of recoupment. . . . the trial 
court did not err in ruling as a matter of law that 
no such prejudicial circumstances existed or would 
bar recoupment." 
and also, at 789: 
"It would be highly inequitable to allow plaintiffs 
to retain something that was not theirs." 
Likewise, in this case, there is no prejudice to State 
Line in allowing Lewises to recoup and set off the 
destruction caused by State Line against the redemption 
price. At most there would have been a delay of 43 days in 
either payment of the redemption price to State Line or in 
State Line's receipt of a sheriff's deed. On the other hand, 
there would be a great deal of prejudice to Lewises if 
recoupment or set-off is not allowed since that would result 
in either a denial of their right to redeem (because State 
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Line had made it impossible to redeem) or in a lengthy 
proceeding to recover from State Line the damages it caused 
by its wrongful actions. Equity, therefore, requires a right 
of recoupment or set-off. Mortgage foreclosure proceedings, 
including the accompanying rights of redemption, are 
equitable proceedings, Looslev, supra, and equity should be 
done in such proceedings. 
State Line argued below that the damages it caused to 
Lewises could not be set-off against the redemption price 
since those damages were unliquidated, relying on King v. 
Firm, 3 U.2d 419, 285 P.2d 1114 (1955), and Nutter v. 
Occidental Pet. Land & Dev. Corp., 117 Ariz. 458, 573 P.2d 
532 (1977). It is interesting to note that the plaintiffs in 
Freston v. Gulf Oil Co. also relied on King v. Firm in 
support of their position against recoupment but this court 
in Freston determined that King v. Firm had no application. 
In fact, this court in King v. Firm stated that the reasons 
for not allowing the offset of an unrelated debt on a 
promissory note against rental due under the lease were that 
the note "was not due at the time of the trial," (p.116) and 
that the "tenant did not claim an offset but claimed that no 
rent was owing" (p.118). The court further stated, at 117: 
"Thus under some circumstances a tenant would be 
required to pay the rent or lose his rights to the 
property under the lease although the landlord owed 
him more money than the amount of the rent. This 
possibly would not be so if it were undisputed that 
there was presently due and owing from the landlord 
to the tenant more money than the amount due and 
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owing by the tenant on the rent and the tenant 
definitely claimed the right to offset one claim 
against the other." (emphasis supplied) 
The tenant in that case was deprived of his tenancy but 
the court, nevertheless, held that the balance due on the 
note should be offset against the rent due and a judgment was 
entered in favor of the tenant after deducting the amount of 
the rent, thus granting the offset. The court further stated 
that the tenant could have regained possession of the 
property but he did not seek that remedy. See p. 1119. 
Thus, King v. Firm is supportive of everything Lewises are 
seeking in this action. 
It is also important to note that the claimed offset for 
the balance due on the note in King v. Firm did not arise out 
of the rental arrangement between the landlord and the 
tenant. This is an important distinction made in many of the 
cases dealing with the right of set-off. For example, in 
Nutter. supra, the other case relied on by State Line below, 
the set-off for damages for breach of contract sought in a 
case pending in another county was not allowed against the 
amount due in a mortgage foreclosure action since they were 
totally unrelated. However, the court in Nutter stated, at 
534: 
11 f
. . . defendant may counterclaim or set off ^  a 
claim or demand against plaintiff which is 
connected with the mortgage transaction and affects 
the consideration thereof . . .' Owen v. Mecham, 
9 Ariz. App. 529 at 532, 454 P.2d 577 at 580 
(1969).» 
and also: 
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"Claims for unliquidated damages have been held not 
the proper subject matter of a setoff or 
counterclaim in a mortgage foreclosure suit unless 
some special equity exists in the pleader's favor," 
(emphasis supplied) 
In Rooue River Mcrmt. Co. v. Shaw, 243 Ore. 54, 411 P.2d 440 
(1966), the court explained the different meanings and 
applications of the terms "set-off," "recoupment" and 
"counterclaim," at pages 442-3: 
"Recoupment is confined to matters arising out of 
and connected with the transaction upon which the 
action is brought . . . . 
1,1
 Set-off1 is not synonymous with recoupment only 
in that it is a 'money demand by the defendant 
against the plaintiff arising upon contract and 
constituting a debt independent of and unconnected 
with the cause of action set forth in the 
complaint. 
Only 'counterclaim' permits affirmative relief . . 
. . Recoupment and set-off may be available as 
defenses for the purpose of liquidating the whole 
or part of plaintiff's claim in situations where an 
independent action would not lie." 
The court held that recoupment was available to the defendant 
in that case even if a counterclaim was not since the right 
of recoupment arose out of the transaction set forth in the 
complaint. 
While the terms recoupment and set-off are sometimes 
used interchangeably, it appears that the right of 
recoupment, or set-off, is allowed if it arises out of the 
transaction against which it is to be recouped or offset and 
is further allowed, even if it is for an unliquidated amount, 
if "there is some special equity . . . in the pleader's 
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favor," Nutter. supra, at 534, or if there is "some equitable 
ground for being protected against his adversary's demand." 
Scarano v, Scarano. 132 N.J. Eq. 362, 28 A.2d 425 (1942), (a 
case in which a set-off of an unrelated, unliquidated debt 
was allowed in a mortgage foreclosure action) . Some of the 
equities which have been held to be grounds for allowance of 
unliquidated setoffs are fraud, nonresidence of a party, 
insolvency or other "embarrassment in enforcing the demand at 
law." Caldwell v. Stevens, 64 Okl. 287, 167 Pac. 610 (1917), 
at 612; Sinclair Refining Co. v. Midland Oil Co., 55 F.2d 42 
(4th Cir. 1932); McFall v. Burley Tobacco Growers1 Co-op. 
Ass'n, 246 Ky. 278, 54 S.W.2d 922 (1932). 
Equity, of course, recognizes any ground which fairness 
would require to be offset against or recouped from the 
"adversary's demand." Since the demolition of the motel 
property is the destruction of the essence of this action, 
the asset which is to be preserved and protected in this 
equitable foreclosure proceeding, and which is the property 
to be redeemed by the Lewises, fairness dictates that Lewises 
be allowed to recoup or offset the cost of repair or 
restoration against the redemption price. Furthermore, 
Lewises1 right and ability to redeem has been prejudiced by 
the destruction of the property and the business conducted on 
that property. Equity should intervene in such a case. It 
is clear, too, that the claim for recoupment or setoff arises 
out of the foreclosure and redemption process—the same 
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transaction out of which State Line's right and demand for 
the redemption price arose. Therefore, setoff or recoupment 
is warranted in this case under either ground set forth in 
the cases discussed above. 
State Line's argument below that the claimed offset is 
unliquidated and, therefore, cannot be offset, while contrary 
to the cases and principles just discussed, is also 
unavailing because the redemption price itself is 
unliquidated. The purpose of the hearing provided for in 
Rule 69(f)(3) is to determine the amount of the redemption 
price and, until that determination is made, the redemption 
price must be considered unliquidated. The same process 
required to determine that price can determine the amount of 
any offset or recoupment. And, especially if Lewises are 
entitled to an equitable offset against the redemption price, 
that redemption price cannot be considered liquidated until 
that determination is made. If the lower court had held the 
hearing to determine the redemption price as originally 
scheduled on September 27, 1989, the amount of the redemption 
price and of the costs to repair and restore would have been 
fixed and liquidated in advance of the expiration of the 
extended redemption period on October 10, 1989 or of the 
seven-day period for payment of additional amounts required 
for redemption as set forth in Rule 69(f)(3). It should be 
remembered that Lewises had already obtained a bid to restore 
the demolished property (R.530-9) and gave State Line plenty 
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of time to do the same (R.662, p.13-14). It should be 
remembered, also, that part of the amount State Line was 
demanding to redeem the property was $14,134.20 as its own 
costs incurred in demolishing the property (R.379). The 
propriety and reasonableness of this amount still had to be 
determined at a hearing based on evidence to be submitted by 
State Line and, perhaps, challenged by Lewises. Evidence of 
the costs to repair or restore the demolished property could 
easily and should logically have been considered at the same 
hearing. 
The fact that a hearing under Rule 69(f)(3) is, or can 
be, an accelerated hearing without the benefit of the lengthy 
discovery and trial preparation of other proceedings should 
make no difference. Counterclaims (and, therefore, setoffs 
and recoupments (See Rogue River Meruit, supra) are allowed in 
unlawful detainer actions, which are also accelerated 
proceedings. White v. District Court of Fourth Judicial 
District. 120 Utah 173, 232 P.2d 785 (1951), in which this 
court stated that to require a party to bring a separate 
action to restrain the unlawful detainer action or to assert 
the counterclaim: 
" . . . would be inconsistent with the spirit and 
purpose of the New Rules of Civil Procedure which 
was to simplify and expedite procedure and to 
consolidate litigation wherever that could^ be done 
without confusion or prejudice to the rights of 
litigants." 
Other examples of accelerated proceedings could be given, the 
most notable of which may be an application for a temporary 
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restraining order or preliminary injunction. It is well-
known that disputes are often resolved, rightly or wrongly, 
by a preliminary injunction, which can be obtained in as 
little as ten days, since the court makes a determination as 
to the likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the 
merits. In recognition of this, no doubt, the Supreme 
Court's Advisory Committee's Proposed Rules Modifications of 
March 5, 1990 proposes that a trial on the merits may be 
"advanced and consolidated with the hearing of the 
application" for preliminary injunction. Proposed Rule 
65A(a) (2) and (e)(4), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
available from the Administrative Office of the Courts. 
Thus, the time requirements for a hearing under Rule 69(f)(3) 
is no justification for a refusal to consider Lewises' right 
to an offset or recoupment against the redemption price. 
The lower court had properly set a hearing to determine 
the reasonableness and propriety of the redemption amount. 
It should have proceeded to hear that matter including any 
evidence the parties could produce with respect to the damage 
done to the property itself and the cost to repair that 
damage. The expenditures of State Line in causing the damage 
should not be allowed as part of the redemption price and the 
costs to repair the damage or to restore the property to the 
condition it was in at the time of the sheriff's sale should 
be deducted from that redemption price. 
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POINT IV 
THE REMEDY PROVIDED IN RULE 69(g) (1) DOES NOT APPLY 
IN THIS CASE NOR DOES IT PRECLUDE AN OFFSET UNDER A 
RULE 69(f)(3) DETERMINATION. 
State Line argued below, and in its untimely motion for 
summary disposition on appeal, that Lewises are limited to 
the remedy for waste provided to the sheriff's sale purchaser 
in Rule 69(g)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. One reason 
asserted for that position by State Line is that it claims 
Rule 69(g)(1) requires the commencement of a separate action 
for waste and that it is entitled to the "due process" of 
being served with a summons and complaint and of proceeding 
"through the normal process of litigation, including 
discovery and the usual trial preparation." It claims that 
it "has never been named as a party in this action nor has it 
been served with a summons and complaint in any other action. 
State Line is involved in this action only by virtue of its 
being a purchaser at the sheriff's sale." Respondent's 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion 
for Summary Disposition, pp. 4-5, 7-8. State Line ignores 
the fact that, once the purchaser's bid is accepted at the 
sheriff's sale, "he submits himself to the jurisdiction of 
the court and becomes a party to the cause in which the sale 
has been decreed." Allen v. Martin. 61 Miss. 78, (1883); 
Dills v. Jasper. 33 111. 262, (1864); Traveler's Insurance 
Co. v. Thompson. 140 Neb. 109, 299 N.W. 329 (1941). State 
Line, as the purchaser at the sheriff's sale, is subject to 
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the jurisdiction of the court with respect to the property 
purchased, including proceedings to compel payment of the 
amount bid or for contempt under Rule 69(e)(4), motions for 
restraining orders under Rule 69(g)(1), motions for judgment 
against the judgment creditor or the judgment debtor under 
Rule 69(g)(2), and petitions to determine the reasonableness 
and propriety of the redemption amount under Rule 69(f)(3). 
No separate summons and complaint and lengthy discovery or 
trial proceedings are prescribed for any of these matters. 
State Line has inserted itself into this case and must be 
prepared to accept the rules which govern it, including those 
which govern its own actions with respect to the property it 
purchased, knowing that it was subject to rights of 
redemption and a delay in, and possible denial of, 
possession. The "due process" provided to State Line by 
scheduling a hearing on Lewises' petition in 30 days rather 
than the two days allowed under Rule 69(f)(3) goes far beyond 
the "undue process" of the one-day notice it gave to Lewises 
on its Motion to Dissolve and the five days, and later one 
day, forced on Lewises by the court, on State Line's 
insistence, to deposit the full $256,000.00 demanded for 
redemption. State Line's concepts of due process seem to 
vary depending upon the party against whom process is taken. 
State Line takes a similar approach to its construction 
of Rule 69. It strictly construes the portions of Rule 69 
which seem to favor it but will not allow a similar strict 
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construction of the portions which may favor the Lewises. It 
insists that the provisions of Rule 69(f)(3) do not allow for 
setoff or recoupment against the redemption price because 
they are not expressly provided for therein. Yet, it insists 
that the terms "purchaser" and "tenant in possession" in Rule 
69(g)(1) apply to Lewises and to State Line, respectively, 
when, strictly construed, Lewises, even if they redeemed, 
would not be a "purchaser or his successor in interest" nor 
would State Line be a "tenant in possession." Rule 69(g)(1) 
was obviously not drafted in contemplation of a destruction 
of the property by the purchaser in violation of the rights 
of redemption. Rather, it was meant to deal with waste 
committed by a party already in possession of the property, 
who could be the judgment debtor or his tenant, in violation 
of the rights of the purchaser. It appears that Rule 
69(g)(1) was intended to protect the purchaser at the 
sheriff's sale while Rule 69(f)(3) was intended to protect 
the redeeming parties. It is far more logical, therefore, to 
allow Lewises to proceed under Rule 69(f)(3) to protect them 
against the wrongs of State Line than it is to force them 
under Rule 69(g)(1), which offers no protection against the 
wrongful conduct of State Line but only prejudices their 
rights. 
The inconsistency of State Line's position is also 
apparent from its claim that Lewises have no rights under the 
first sentence of Rule 69(g)(1) to restrain waste before 
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redemption but do have the right to sue for damages under the 
last sentence of Rule 69(g)(1) after redemption (R.661, p.21, 
1.19-20; p.33-34). The words "purchaser or his successor in 
interest" are given different meanings by State Line in 
accordance with the result it wants to obtain. This 
inconsistency only underscores the fact that Rule 69(g)(1) 
was intended to provide remedies to the purchaser and not to 
redeeming parties. On the other hand, Rule 69(f)(3) was 
intended to provide remedies to redeeming parties. The lack 
of any setoff or recoupment language in Rule 69(f)(3) means 
only that the drafters did not anticipate that a purchaser at 
a sheriff's sale would demolish the property during the 
redemption period. In fact, it is difficult even now to 
imagine that anyone would do such a thing 1 But, as 
demonstrated in Point III above, the language of Rule 
69(f)(3) is broad enough to include a remedy for the 
redeeming parties against the inequitable conduct of the 
purchaser, especially as it applies to an equitable 
proceeding where fairness should prevail over form. 
State Line's unreasonable and inequitable interpretation 
is illustrated more fully by a consideration of its 
contention that Lewises' sole remedy is to first redeem by 
paying everything demanded and then to sue for waste. One 
fact which Lewises have not yet been given an opportunity to 
demonstrate is that they would have deposited into court on 
August 28, 1989 the full $256,000.00 which State Line 
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demanded for redemption except for the fact that State Line 
destroyed both the physical property and the operating 
business which would have stood as security for the 
$256,000.00 redemption money. They spent the six-month 
redemption period trying to raise the redemption money from 
lenders who were willing to lend them the money secured by 
the property, as it was, with the operating business thereon. 
They were turned down because of the actions of State Line 
(R.642, Para. 4). 
State Line now takes the position that Lewises must be 
able, without regard to the condition and value of the 
property itself, to produce the $256,000.00 redemption money 
or they must forfeit their right of redemption and their 
claim for waste on the property. They must redeem and obtain 
absolute title before they have standing to sue, so the 
argument goes. Surely, the right of redemption is not just 
for the wealthy! It should protect those without huge bank 
accounts as well. For property owners without large cash 
reserves, the ability to redeem lies in the property itself 
because that represents their ability to borrow the funds and 
provide security therefor to their lenders. The property 
itself is, in a sense, the redemption money, especially when 
the property is an operating business. Remember that the 
Lewises had previously operated that motel business and were, 
at the time of the sheriff's sale and attempted redemption, 
and still are, operating a similar motel on nearby property 
37 
and they intended to resume the operation of the motel on 
this property. When State Line demolished the improvements 
on the property, it deprived them of the redemption money. 
To allow State Line to take the redemption money from Lewises 
and then come in to court and say "too bad, you can't 
redeem," would be to condone a crime. 
Despite this attempt by State Line, intentional or not, 
to frustrate Lewises' ability to redeem, Lewises have shown 
good faith by depositing $50,000.00 cash with the court and 
have demonstrated an ability to redeem at the full demanded 
price, until the lower court cut their efforts short by its 
one day "put up or shut-up" order of October 2, 1989. The 
law ought to give Lewises a reasonable opportunity to redeem 
and, if the law doesn't provide such a remedy, surely equity 
does. 
The use of Rule 69(f)(3) to resolve the total question 
of the redemption price, including any setoffs or 
recoupments, is entirely consistent with the holdings of 
cases in other states. For example, in Cogswell v. Brown, 
102 Wash. 625, 173 Pac. 623 (1918), the purchaser at the sale 
entered into possession of the foreclosed land and "denuded 
it of its merchantable timber." When the mortgagor attempted 
to offset the value of the removed timber against the 
redemption price, the purchaser argued, as does State Line 
here, "that there has been no redemption; that the statutory 
method of redemption is exclusive, and no tender of the 
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amount found to be due on the foreclosure with interest and 
costs having been made and the time having now passed, 
plaintiffs are without remedy . . . .ff The court held, 
however, on p. 624: 
"It would be idle to require a mortgagor to pay or 
tender the amount due when a purchaser at the sale 
had used the property to his own profit and was in 
equity or at law indebted to him in a sum far in 
excess of the amount due on the mortgage debt." 
"Defendant Brown insists that the removal of timber 
is neither "rents" nor "profits" within the meaning 
of the statute, and that, no tender having been 
made, and the law providing for no accounting other 
than for "rents and profits," the bar of a fixed 
limitation intervenes to protect their title. 
Aside from the narrow construction which must be 
given to the statute to sustain this theory and 
which we would be loath to adopt, it seems that the 
law is ample to sustain the present action although 
it be held that the removal of timber and its 
conversion is neither "rents" nor "profits." 
Similarly, in Stevens Mills Paper Co. v. Myers, 116 Me. 
73, 100 At. 11 (1917), the purchaser contended that 
redemption should not be allowed because no tender of the 
redemption price was actually made within the redemption 
period. But, because the purchaser had left the state two 
days before the redemption period expired and remained there 
until after such expiration and the redemption must be made 
to the purchaser directly, the court held that the purchaser: 
"designally prevented the plaintiff from tendering 
performance of the condition of the mortgage by 
rendering it impossible for him to do so, and a 
court of equity will not now listen to his plea 
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that the tender was not seasonably made. To do so 
would be to permit him to take advantage of his own 
wrong and to defeat the debtor's rights by fraud." 
Furthermore, redemption has been allowed after expiration of 
the redemption period on the grounds of accident in numerous 
situations where payment of the redemption money was 
prevented by circumstances ranging from inability to reach 
the place of foreclosure because of an accident to difficulty 
in arranging the financing for the redemption money. Many of 
these situations are reviewed in Kopper v. Dver, 59 Vt. 477, 
9 At. 4 (1887). 
Further support for the position of the Lewises is found 
in Granada. Inc. v. Tanner, 712 P.2d 254 (Utah 1985), one of 
the few other Utah cases which interpret the redemption rule. 
There, as in Loosley, supra, the assignee of the purchaser at 
the sheriff's sale refused to accept a redemption so the 
redeeming party paid the redemption money into court and 
filed a petition to determine the redemption amount pursuant 
to Rule 69(f)(3). In holding that the redemption should be 
allowed, this court stated, at 256: 
"The intent of Rule 69(f)(3) is to allow a 
redemptioner to pay the funds into court so that 
the holder of the certificate of sale cannot clog 
the equity of redemption by refusing to cooperate 
in the redemption process." 
In that case there was no dispute over the redemption amount 
yet the court considered the use of a Rule 69(f)(3) petition 
to determine the redemption amount to be the appropriate 
procedure to prevent the holder of the certificate of sale 
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from clogging the equity of redemption by refusing to 
cooperate. If anything, the refusal to cooperate in the 
redemption process in our case goes beyond that in Granada 
and Lewises' use of a Rule 69(f)(3) petition and the deposit 
in court to prevent the clogging of the equity of redemption 
is also the appropriate procedure here. 
There is sufficient precedent in the law and more than 
sufficient discretion in equity to grant the relief requested 
by Lewises. They have demonstrated their good faith by 
depositing $50,000.00 with the court, which is far more than 
they estimated would be required to redeem after deducting 
the costs of repairing the damage done by State Line. Rule 
69(f)(3) was designed to provide relief to redeeming parties 
and should provide such relief here. Rule 69(g)(1), on the 
other hand, was designed to protect purchasers at sheriff's 
sales and should not be strained to deny relief to the 
redeeming parties here. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts of this case constitute an "appropriate 
instance" for an extension of the redemption period and the 
lower court properly exercised its equitable powers to extend 
the time for redemption for only forty-three days until 
October 10, 1989. The efforts of State Line to dissolve that 
extension and to force the Lewises to deposit the full amount 
demanded by it on five-days' or one-day's notice were 
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improper and were but a continuation of its efforts to "clog" 
the equity of redemption which began when it sent a bulldozer 
in to demolish the improvements on the property. The lower 
court1s resulting termination of the Lewises1 right of 
redemption was in error. 
Having filed a petition under Rule 69(f)(3) to determine 
the reasonableness or propriety of the redemption amount, the 
Lewises were entitled to a hearing on that petition as 
prescribed by the rule. Not only the costs incurred by State 
Line in the demolition of improvements, and claimed as an 
addition to the redemption price, but also the damage caused 
by State Line in such demolition, and claimed by Lewises as a 
deduction from the redemption price, are appropriate matters 
to consider at such a hearing. Both arise out of the same 
event and are part and parcel of the same foreclosure and 
redemption proceeding. Rule 69(f)(3) outlines the 
appropriate procedure to govern this situation. It was 
designed to protect redeeming parties against unreasonable 
and improper demands by the purchaser. On the other hand, 
Rule 69(g)(1) was designed to protect the purchaser against 
improper actions of a tenant in possession and has no 
application to the circumstances of this case. The Lewises 
should not be deprived of an opportunity to redeem their 
property because of the wrongful destruction of that property 
by State Line. Equity supplies the relief and Rule 69(f)(3) 
provides the procedure. 
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The lower court's order of October 13, 1989 should be 
reversed and this case should be remanded with instructions 
to schedule a hearing pursuant to Rule 69(f)(3) to consider 
both additions to and deductions from the redemption price, 
including the costs of restoration of the property to the 
condition it was in at the time of the sheriff's sale. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Ralph J. Marsh 
Attorneys for Appellants 
43 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that four (4) true and correct copies 
of the foregoing Appellant's Brief were hand-delivered on the 
day of March, 1989, to the following: 
R. STEPHEN MARSHALL and 
MARILYN M. HENRIKSEN 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
Attorneys for Respondent 
50 South Main Street, #1600 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
